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INTRODUCTION 
 The aim of this paper is to examine the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of two approaches to mitigating the offense given, and 
harm threatened, by prenatal testing for impairments:1 limiting such 
testing to the most severe diseases and impairments, or imposing no 
medical limits at all. Although I favor the latter approach, I will ar-
gue that the alternatives present a choice between distinct evils. 
 To set the stage for this discussion, it is necessary to challenge the 
conventional picture of prenatal testing, its purposes, and its dan-
gers. On this conventional view, prenatal testing serves the legiti-
mate medical function of preventing severe diseases in future chil-
dren, as well as the associated health threats to the parents and 
families of those children.2 Because of the small number of conditions 
that are currently detectable, such testing is largely used for the ap-
propriate purpose of preventing such severe conditions as cystic fi-
brosis (CF), spina bifida, Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), as 
well as Down syndrome and several other trisomies. There is one 
glaring exception: sex-selection, which is devoid of medical justifica-
                                                                                                                    
 * Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Mary-
land; B.A., Yale University, 1975; J.D., University of Michigan, 1978; M.A. (Psychology), 
University of North Carolina, 1984. 
 1. I will refer to prenatal testing for “impairments,” rather than “disabilities,” to re-
flect the now-conventional understanding of impairment as physical or mental abnormal-
ity, and disability as an interaction between such limitations and an individual’s environ-
ment. Clearly, a disability so understood is not the kind of condition that can be tested for 
prenatally, or genetically.  
 2. See, e.g., COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIV. OF HEALTH SCIS. POLICY, 
INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS]; PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. RESEARCH, SCREENING 
AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS (1983) [hereinafter SCREENING AND 
COUNSELING]; Wolfram Henn, Consumerism in Prenatal Diagnosis: A Challenge for Ethi-
cal Guidelines, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 444 (2000). 
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tion except for sex-linked diseases. Fortunately, however, there is lit-
tle demand for prenatal sex selection in the United States, even for 
the relatively benign purpose of family balance; such testing is 
discouraged or condemned by professional organizations and, in some 
places, by law.3 
 But, according to this conventional view, a serious threat is just 
over the biotechnological horizon. “[T]he age of positive eugenics is 
almost upon us.”4 It will soon be possible to do prenatal genetic test-
ing for minor disorders, and for minor risks of severe disorders; in 
the not so distant future, genetic tests will be available for positive 
traits as well, like intelligence. The medical community, particularly 
the obstetric establishment, views this prospect, with sanctimonious 
horror: 
It may be too early to warn that we are at the edge of a slippery 
slope towards a new dimension of eugenics, but we must realise 
that new tools to fulfill the tempting wish to have not only healthy, 
but gifted children will soon be in our hands.5 
This is not a wish, however tempting, that doctors should help their 
patients to fulfill, because terminating a pregnancy of a baby ex-
pected to be healthy is “counterintutive to the Hippocratic ideas of 
health care.”6 To avoid this kind of professional abuse, “there is an 
urgent need to extend the current ban on prenatal paternity and 
gender testing to any parameter of prenatal genetic diagnosis that is 
not immediately related to severe disease in the prospective child.”7 
 A clue that there is something very wrong in this picture should 
come from the restriction to “severe disease.” It would be considered 
not only unnecessary but unethical and perverse for doctors to refuse 
to provide preventative or therapeutic services to their patients, or 
the public, for minor diseases (except in cases of extreme scarcity). 
Indeed, much of our current health care budget, and our public fund-
ing for research, prevention, and treatment, is directed towards ar-
guably minor, or at least non-severe diseases. If prenatal testing 
serves the legitimate medical function of preventing diseases, why 
should it be wrong (if less urgent) to extend it to minor diseases? This 
restriction should make us question whether prenatal testing can be 
seen as a medical function at all, in the widely-accepted sense of a 
function serving to protect or restore the health of individual pa-
                                                                                                                    
 3.  ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 2, at 8, 85-86; Ethics Comm. of the Am. 
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selection for Non-Medical Reasons, 75 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 861 (2001); J. McMillan, Sex Selection in the United Kingdom, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 28.  
 4. Henn, supra note 2, at 445. 
 5. Id. at 446. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 445. 
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tients. If it is not, however, we are not at the edge of a slippery slope, 
but already in an ethical limbo, facing unresolved questions about 
the basic legitimacy of a non-medical practice carried out by doctors 
and other health professionals. 
I.   DEMEDICALIZING PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 
 Prenatal diagnosis—whether through amniocentesis, chorionic 
villuis sampling, or preimplantation genetic diagnosis; whether for 
Down, CF, female gender, or blue eyes—needs to be seen for what it 
is, or more importantly, what it is not. It is not a medical procedure—
a procedure intended to protect or restore an individual’s health—
unless it is undertaken to protect the mother’s health, or the health 
of the fetus or infant, through early intervention. It is, typically, a 
procedure to identify and destroy unwanted organisms. But to say 
that it is not a medical procedure is not to say that it is wrong, or 
even wrong for a doctor to perform. A pregnancy test for an unmar-
ried adolescent, undertaken to procure an abortion at the earliest 
possible date (if the test is positive), is not a medical procedure ei-
ther, unless it is intended to protect the health of the adolescent, 
which it rarely is (except in the expansive World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) sense of “health” in which avoiding the social burden of 
adolescent child-rearing is a matter of health). It is quite possible to 
regard abortion as justifiable, and to regard doctors as the appropri-
ate agents to carry it out, while denying that it serves to protect or 
restore the health of individual patients. One can take a similar view 
of physician-assisted suicide—the fact that suicide is not health-
protecting or restoring does not mean that doctors should not assist 
it.  
 What this does suggest, however, is that mainstream opponents of 
prenatal sex-selection cannot reject it on the grounds that it is not a 
bona-fide medical service. When groups such as the Institute of 
Medicine piously condemn genetic testing and abortion for sex-
selection on the grounds that it is “a misuse of genetic services,”8 they 
need to explain why abortion for child- or disability-prevention is any 
less of an abuse, since neither typically serves to promote or protect 
the health of any individual human being. If doctors can legitimately 
perform non-healing functions in aborting the unwanted fetus car-
ried by an adolescent girl, or in honoring the express desire of an eld-
erly patient to avoid a lingering death, then why would they not per-
form a legitimate function by letting parents have the kind of chil-
dren they want—male, brown-eyed, or unimpaired? The reason can-
not be simply that facilitating such parental choice is not a medical 
                                                                                                                    
 8. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 2, at 105.  
298  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:295 
 
function.  
 The standard critique of sex selection conflates two distinctions: 
between pathological and normal human variations (or disease and 
non-disease states), and between medical and non-medical functions. 
Unlike many disability scholars and bioethicists, I believe there can 
be a plausible biological basis for the former distinction, between 
pathological and normal states; that the distinction need not reflect 
social, cultural, or moral values.9 But while this first distinction is 
needed to explain the second, which concerns the protection or resto-
ration of health, the two distinctions are not identical. A doctor who 
prevents the existence of someone who will have certain pathological 
states—diseases or impairments—is not performing a medical func-
tion (although he may be performing a public-health function). The 
doctor who selects among in vitro embryos to find a compatible mar-
row-donor for an ailing child is performing a medical function for 
that child, but not for those embryos. If the rationale for the doctor’s 
services to enhance the couple’s freedom of choice or to save an ailing 
child (when no else else’s rights are violated), why should it matter if 
the conditions they “prevent,” unlike female sex or brown eyes, are 
abnormal, pathological, or inherently undesirable? There need not be 
anything wrong in a doctor’s performing a non-medical function; the 
job descriptions of professionals often change, and sometimes for the 
better.10  
II.   TWO EVILS 
 The more credible concern about the expansion of prenatal testing 
is that doctors who assist their patients in aborting fetuses or dis-
carding embryos, on the basis of sex or marrow-incompatibility, are 
doing something wrong, not because it is non-medical, but because it 
abets the degradation of the parental role and the commodification of 
children. The concern is that once parents who intend to have chil-
dren can set conditions on the kind of children they will have, they 
slough off the commitment to loving and rearing whatever child they 
have and start down the slope towards designer babies; toward the 
corruption of child-making by a consumer mentality.11 This concern, 
however, grounds an objection to prenatal testing for disease and 
disability, as well as for sex and marrow-compatibility. 
 I do not want to dismiss this concern, because I think that the 
threat is real, if exaggerated. Moreover, I agree that autonomy has 
                                                                                                                    
 9. See generally Robert Wachbroit, Health and Disease, Concepts of, in 2 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 533 (1998). 
 10. See, e.g., John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 361 (1997). 
 11. See, e.g., SCREENING AND COUNSELING, supra note 2, at 57-58. 
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enjoyed an unwarranted ascendancy as the “master value” in bio-
ethics, and that its promotion must often yield to other concerns.12 
But I will argue that the threat of insufficient commitment and 
commodification is not the only one raised by prenatal testing for 
disability, and that it may be the lesser of two evils. If such testing 
can be seen as the first step towards a noxious and destructive 
finickyness in the creation of children and families, it can also be 
seen as something very different and less novel. The phenomenology 
of selecting against disability and selecting for desired traits may be 
quite different, even if certain moral theories, such as standard act-
utilitarianism, treat them as similar.13 Eliminating disabled fetuses 
or embryos may be seen as applying modern technology to the an-
cient imperative of discarding defective children, rather than to the 
(alleged) contemporary desire for “a perfect baby.”14 
 The classical Greeks who left defective children on mountainsides 
were not nascent perfectionists; they were more likely to have been 
frightened, superstitious parents anxious to rid themselves of chil-
dren with the marks of divine disapproval. Like modern parents who 
will not abort after the second trimester, ancient parents got rid of 
defective children with some scruples and constraints—they would 
not kill the children directly, but only facilitate their death from 
natural causes such as exposure.15 Beyond avoiding stigma and di-
vine displeasure, their aspirations for their children may have been 
exceedingly modest. 
 The most effective way of counteracting the contemporary expres-
sion of those enduring fears and superstitions in the demand for pre-
natal disability testing may be to refuse to dignify such testing as a 
medical function; to treat it instead as a consumer service. The like-
lihood of serious impairment would be neither a necessary nor suffi-
cient condition for that service. Permitting or requiring doctors to of-
fer prospective parents the widest available menu of prenatal tests, 
including but not limited to tests for various impairments, might 
help to de-stigmatize disability. But such reproductive freedom 
would not be a “positive good,” or an unmixed blessing. A regime of 
unfettered parental choice would take the focus off disability only by 
further corrupting the process of child-making, encouraging a finicky 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, Feminism and Bioethics, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BE-
YOND REPRODUCTION 47, 52-53 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996). 
 13. See, e.g., Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best 
Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413 (2001). 
 14. See GLENN MCGEE, THE PERFECT BABY (2000). 
 15. For the classical Greek practice of exposing unwanted or defective children, see 
SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (Roger D. Dawe ed., 1982). For a discussion of the classical 
Greek attitudes towards causation action and responsibility, see ARTHUR W.H. ADKINS, 
MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES (1975). 
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consumer mentality or a vulgar perfectionism on the part of prospec-
tive parents. Some would argue that this would be too high a price to 
pay for alleviating the stigma of disability; others would argue that it 
would fail, or backfire, increasing intolerance for disability. 
III.   TWO APPROACHES 
 There are two approaches to regulating prenatal testing that ap-
pear to parallel the two concerns about commodification and stigma. 
One approach would limit testing/responsibility/liability to a small 
subset of severe or widespread disabilities; the other would expand 
testing/responsibility/liability beyond disability to a full range of con-
ditions that parents might seek to avoid, with the “burden of disabil-
ity” merely one factor in the assessment of duties and damages. 
Dorothy Wertz and Jeff Botkin have offered very different versions of 
the former approach;16 I favor the latter approach and will defend it 
here, not as a means of promoting parental autonomy, which I regard 
as a suspect or overrated goal, but as a way of mitigating the harm 
and muting the expressive significance of prenatal testing for people 
with disabilities. 
 I will argue that these approaches should be seen as responsive to 
the two distinct concerns about prenatal testing I have sketched 
above: the growing sway of a consumer mentality toward procreation, 
and the continuing stigmatization of disabilities. Although both 
threats involve a degradation of the parental role, resistance to them 
may pull us in opposite directions. Disabilities may be less stigma-
tized in a reproductive regime in which neither they, nor any subset 
of them, have a special role in legitimizing abortion; consumerism 
may have less sway in a regime that permits testing only for the 
most severe disabilities. But the former takes the onus off disability 
by promoting a broader consumer mentality, while the latter dis-
courages such a mentality by keeping the onus squarely on disability. 
Since it is neither feasible nor morally acceptable to prohibit all pre-
natal testing, we will be faced with a choice of evils. 
 To make the distinction between these two purposes is not to deny 
that some people with specific impairments, or their advocates, favor 
a narrowing approach that excludes their impairment, or even to 
deny that the dominant motivation for a narrowing approach may be 
to avoid the stigmatization of as many impairments as possible. But 
there is considerable force to the argument made by critics of line-
                                                                                                                    
 16. Dorothy C. Wertz, Drawing Lines: Notes for Policymakers, in PRENATAL TESTING 
AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 261 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000); Jeffrey R. Botkin, 
Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 32 [herein-
after Botkin, Fetal Privacy]; Jeffrey R. Botkin, Line Drawing: Developing Professional 
Standards for Prenatal Diagnostic Services, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS, 
supra, at 288 [hereinafter Botkin, Line Drawing]. 
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drawing that, if this is its purpose, it is self-defeating; that the focus 
and debate on the placement of the line will only serve to re-affirm 
the legitimacy of impairment in general as a basis for abortion.17 
Those impairments placed on the near side of the line may enjoy lit-
tle or no reduction in stigma, since their exclusion as grounds for 
abortion may be perceived as the result of balancing or compromise, 
not as the result of substantially changed beliefs about the burden 
they impose.  
 The tension between narrowing and widening approaches has a 
rough counterpart or analogue in debates about employee drug test-
ing and airport profiling; between those who favor ever-greater re-
finement in the criteria for imposing an intrusive or demeaning pro-
cedure and those who favor its universalization. In the latter cases, 
the imposition of the same drug tests and security tests on everyone 
largely eliminates the insult to the preponderantly innocent mem-
bers of suspect groups, at the cost of small inconvenience to everyone, 
great administrative burdens, and a more pervasive threat to civil 
liberties; in the case of prenatal testing, the costs of “universaliza-
tion” are far less tangible: the corruption of parental attachment by a 
consumer mentality. As in prenatal testing, the costs of further re-
finement in drug testing are the greater stigmatization of those se-
lected against by the more refined procedure, and the “penumbral” 
stigmatization of those who barely pass.  
 In the next Section, I will offer a critique of the most fully devel-
oped narrowing proposal. In the final Sections, I will take up two 
significant challenges to the alternative approach of consumer sover-
eignty: that it will increase, not reduce, the stigmatization of people 
with disabilities, and that it cannot accommodate wrongful life or 
wrongful birth actions under the rubric of medical malpractice or 
autonomy violation. 
IV.   PROPOSALS FOR RESTRICTING PRENATAL TESTING 
 Jeff Botkin and Dorothy Wertz have proposed quite different nar-
rowing approaches, with very different kinds of restrictions on prena-
tal testing, both designed to maintain the medical legitimacy of the 
procedure.18 Botkin would permit testing only for conditions expected 
to impose serious burdens on parents and families,19 while Wertz 
would permit testing for any pathological condition for which the fu-
ture child was at high risk, regardless of severity. Wertz’s approach 
                                                                                                                    
 17. See Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Ge-
netic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY 
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 3, 30-31. 
 18. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16; Wertz, supra note 16. 
 19. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16; Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16. 
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has the virtue of unprincipled consistency; it would permit testing 
and termination for any condition deemed pathological, however mi-
nor, from color-blindness to a missing toe.20 This permissive approach 
would be rejected by most defenders of current practice. I will have 
nothing further to say about it here, since I will be advocating the 
even more permissive alternative of eliminating the requirement 
that the condition tested for be pathological. 
 Botkin would drop the fiction that prenatal testing served any 
medical function for future children, but he argues that it does, or 
could serve, a legitimate medical function for actual parents and 
families—to protect them from harm arising from the birth and up-
keep of children with severe impairments.21 While a notion of “family 
health” would be highly suspect, having the same pretextual quality 
as “maternal anxiety” as a medical justification for abortion in gen-
eral, Botkin bases his standard on family welfare, not health.22 This 
commits him to a broader conception of the doctor’s professional role 
than many doctors and bioethicists would be willing to accept. But 
since I see no reason for restricting the doctor’s role to the protection 
and promotion of health, narrowly conceived, I have no criticism of 
Botkin on this ground. 
 I will not argue, however, that Botkin’s standard is untenable. He 
claims that the line he proposes will not only arrest the slide down 
the slippery slope toward “designer babies,” but mitigate the adverse 
impact of prenatal testing on people with disabilities.23 I do not know 
whether the implementation of his standard would reduce the ad-
verse social and psychological impact on people with disabilities, 
though I am skeptical that it would. What I will claim is that the 
proposal to restrict offers of prenatal testing to conditions likely to 
have a substantial impact on family welfare is ambiguous and un-
workable. Because the correlation between the medical severity of 
the conditions tested for and the psychological impact on families is 
much weaker and less susceptible to generalization than Botkin rec-
ognizes, it is not clear how he can develop a standard of care that 
would protect the welfare of families who had strong but idiosyn-
cratic reactions to traits like female gender or webbed fingers. And to 
the extent that generalizations can be made about family welfare, 
they will license the offer of prenatal testing for traits such as female 
gender or webbed fingers in societies where the birth of children with 
those traits will be expected to have a significant impact on family 
welfare.  
                                                                                                                    
 20. Wertz, supra note 16, at 274-78. 
 21. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 300. 
 22. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16, at 37-38. 
 23. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 305. 
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 In the final Sections, I will take up two significant challenges to 
the alternative approach of consumer sovereignty: that it will in-
crease, not reduce, the stigmatization of people with disabilities, and 
that it cannot accommodate wrongful life or wrongful birth actions 
under the rubric of medical malpractice or autonomy violation. 
V.   FETAL IMPAIRMENT AND PARENTAL WELFARE 
 Botkin’s “family welfare” standard is an unstable hybrid, because 
there is only a tenuous link between the medical severity of the fetal 
abnormality and the welfare of the family. As a medical notion, “se-
verity” offers a workable if vague standard, at least if it is taken to 
involve only an ordinal comparison: most professionals and laypeople 
would rate Tay Sachs more severe than CF; CF more severe than 
color-blindness. But a standard based on “the impact of the medical 
condition on the family,” authorizing testing for “conditions that may 
significantly impair the legitimate interests of the parents [and other 
children]”24 will either yield highly objectionable results in many 
cases or end up as little more than a variant of the parental-
preference standard that Botkin rejects.  
 In an earlier article, Botkin proposes offering tests for conditions 
that would threaten harms to parents “of approximately the same 
magnitude as the harms of an unwanted pregnancy.”25 His list in-
cludes diseases “often fatal in childhood,” chronic illnesses “re-
quir[ing] repeated hospitalization,” conditions that would not allow a 
child “to achieve independence in his or her adult years,” and condi-
tions “of such severity that there are constant demands on the par-
ents for time, effort, and financial resources.”26 As Adrienne Asch has 
argued,27 these features—particularly the last two—have a much 
more contingent relationship than Botkin assumes to the specific 
medical conditions he cites as examples, such as Down and CF. Fre-
quent, extended hospitalizations and life-long dependence may arise 
from deficient, discriminatory, and malleable social arrangements 
rather than from anything inherent in those medical conditions. 
Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that these burdens are 
inherent in those conditions Botkin cites, it is not clear why these 
burdens should be regarded as worse than those of many conditions 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Id. at 300. 
 25. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16, at 36. Botkin arrives at this standard by ar-
guing that it represents the same balancing of parental and family interests with fetal pri-
vacy and confidentiality that permits general abortions through the second trimester. 
Since I do not think fetuses have interests in privacy or confidentiality, I think Botkin’s 
derivation of this standard is mistaken, but this is not the place to make that argument. 
 26. Id. at 37-38. 
 27. Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice 
and Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1649, 1653 (1999). 
304  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:295 
 
he would exclude, such as Huntington’s. Many parents, I suspect, 
would not regard it as a greater harm to raise a child who required 
frequent hospitalization or continuing support than to raise a child 
with a fifty percent chance of premature death from the same degen-
erative condition that they or their spouse will soon die from. Al-
though Botkin’s more recent paper talks about welfare rather than 
harm,28 the problem is the same: he neither supplies an account of 
harm or welfare that would draw the line where he wants it, nor of-
fers evidence of a broad consensus on what counts as a significant 
harm or threat to welfare. 
 A growing body of research suggests that families with severely 
impaired children do not differ significantly in stresses and burdens 
from families with normal children.29 These findings weaken any 
presumption that family welfare will be damaged by the birth of an 
impaired child. Botkin might deny that evidence of the resilience and 
flourishing of families with severely impaired children would weigh 
against his current proposal. He insists that his standard now 
gauges family “impact,” not “burden,”30 so that only evidence of slight 
magnitude, not positive valence, would count against it. But he can-
not maintain this value neutrality for even a single page. Just a 
paragraph above his declaration of neutrality, he asserts that “prac-
titioners should provide information on conditions that may signifi-
cantly impair the legitimate interests of the parents.”31 But talk of 
conditions that “impair” rather than “affect” is hardly more neutral 
than talk of “burden” rather than “impact.” Moreover, Botkin would 
have practitioners assess the “severity” of impact,32 a term which is 
hardly neutral. People ecstatically transformed by birth, marriage, or 
other blessed events would hardly describe the impact of those 
events as “severe.”  
 More important than Botkin’s inconsistency is the problem he 
would confront if he were consistent: the birth of any child, especially 
a first child, is such a transformative event that it may be difficult to 
claim that the birth of a child with a severe impairment will gener-
ally have a more substantial impact. Even if that claim can be estab-
lished by definitional fiat—Botkin would offer testing only for condi-
tions that typically involved extraordinary impacts, such as frequent 
hospitalization, intensive daily medical care, or life-long depend-
ency—his proposal would also require offers of testing for genetically-
                                                                                                                    
 28. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 300. 
 29. See generally Phillip M. Ferguson et al., The Experience of Disability in Families: 
A Synthesis of Research and Parent Narratives, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY 
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 72. 
 30. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 288, 300. 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. 
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detectable athletic, musical, or intellectual prodigy. As Asch points 
out, the additional impact of child prodigies on their families may be 
at least as great as that of children with Down or CF.33 
 Even if Botkin were able to support the generalizations he offers, 
and the lines he expects them to yield, he would have to face the 
problem of exceptions. Taking what is often regarded as a clear case, 
Botkin maintains that  
[p]hysicians should not be obligated to offer prenatal gender test-
ing to all parents, even if we can find justification in isolated cases. 
In general terms, the impact of a child of the unwanted gender on 
the parents is not sufficiently severe to warrant offers of gender se-
lection as the standard of care.34 
It is hard to disagree with Botkin that an average American couple’s 
preference for a boy, or a girl, or a “gender-balanced” family, does not 
implicate their family’s welfare enough to warrant an offer of testing. 
But such a couple is unlikely to want testing specifically for that 
purpose. It is not clear what Botkin would propose in the case of a 
couple or family for whom the birth of a child of the unwanted gender 
might well have a severe impact: if, say, the prospective father or an 
older sibling had a history of sexual abuse toward girls. Presumably, 
Botkin would regard the doctor as obliged to offer prenatal gender 
testing to such parents, if she knew of these unusual circumstances. 
But she would not know unless she asked or inquired. 
 Perhaps Botkin would respond that the doctor was not obliged to 
find out if there were circumstances that made particular fetal traits 
a threat to family welfare. But this would be a striking departure 
from normal medical practice. Doctors are obliged, for example, to 
ask if patients have (relatively rare) allergic response to common an-
tibiotics. If, on the other hand, a doctor would be obliged to ask or in-
quire about circumstances that made even common fetal traits like 
female gender risky to family welfare, then it is not clear what role 
Botkin’s “standard of care” would be left to play. The comparison to 
allergies suggests that the need for inquiry would be, if anything, 
greater in the case of prenatal testing, because threats to family wel-
fare are harder to assess than reactions to antibiotics. If the doctor is 
protecting the parents’ welfare rather than simply fulfilling their 
wishes, she must assess whether the birth of a child with a particu-
lar trait would in fact have (or be likely to have) a substantial impact 
on the family’s welfare. She cannot make that assessment simply by 
asking the parents—they often do not know, and are likely to be 
wrong. 
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 The point is not that physicians should decline to raise the pros-
pect of testing, but that families’ actual responses to children with a 
variety of normal and abnormal traits are sufficiently varied to call 
almost any generalization into question. Botkin’s “standard of care” 
would require an inquiry into family strengths and vulnerabilities 
that would precede or accompany any offer of testing. But such an 
inquiry would eliminate the justification for a standard offer, or a 
routine multiplex test, because the doctor should offer whatever tests 
her inquiry indicates are warranted. Even if those tests in many 
cases were the very ones that would be on Botkin’s standard list, 
they would not enjoy the privileged status that his proposal confers 
on them. 
 There is a further problem with Botkin’s standard as it applies to 
social and cultural settings where his seemingly uncontroversial 
generalizations wouldn’t hold. It simply may be false in India, or in a 
number of Muslim countries, that “[i]n general terms, the impact of a 
child of the unwanted gender on the parents is not sufficiently severe 
to warrant offers of gender selection as the standard of care.”35 The 
birth of a girl, or another girl, may mean impoverishment or stigma-
tization for the family. In other societies, the birth of a child with 
mild but visible deformities such as webbed fingers may have a simi-
lar impact on the family. Perhaps Botkin would contend that the 
parents would not have a “legitimate interest” in avoiding such con-
sequences, even if they were innocent of the underlying prejudices. 
But it seems unreasonably harsh or demanding to claim that parents 
have no legitimate interest in avoiding poverty or ostracism based on 
the prejudices of the society in which they happen to live. Surely 
there is a case to be made at the policy level in these countries for 
limiting gender- and disability-testing, but doctors serving the wel-
fare of their individual patients are hardly the appropriate instru-
ments for that policy. Much like Erik Nord’s proposal to elicit social 
values as a basis for distributing scarce health-care resources,36 Bot-
kin’s standard appears defenseless against profoundly inegalitarian 
social values.  
VI.   IS UNRESTRICTED TESTING A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 
 As I suggested earlier, I am willing to assume, for the sake of ar-
gument, a claim of Botkin’s that many disability critics reject: that 
line-drawing on the basis of parental or family welfare would reduce 
rather than exacerbate the adverse social and psychological effects of 
prenatal testing and selective abortion on existing people with dis-
abilities. My argument has been that his proposal is unworkable as 
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the basis for a standard of care; that it will either yield a morally 
problematic failure to offer testing to families whose welfare is likely 
to be substantially affected by the birth of a child with certain “nor-
mal” traits or medically minor impairments, or else will undermine 
the justification for a standard offer, and instead require complex, 
individualized inquiries into family welfare.  
 The comparative virtue of the alternative approach—of offering 
any and all available testing—is that it would give no official or privi-
leged role to impairments in the determination of whether to offer 
testing or abortion. I do not know whether such a regime would pro-
vide social and psychological benefit to existing people with disabili-
ties. Botkin argues forcefully that it would not: 
[I]t hardly seems beneficial to the welfare of the disabled commu-
nity to advocate that all conditions be subject to prenatal diagnosis 
and selective termination. This would appear to be the fast lane to 
“perfectibilism” and intolerance for progressively less severe dis-
abilities. If society condones and promotes prenatal diagnosis for 
the full spectrum of medical (and nonmedical) conditions, what 
message does that send? If we want to promote inclusiveness, un-
derstanding, and support for those with disabilities, requiring the 
extensive provision of prenatal diagnostic information and services 
would appear to be a poor strategy. My concern is that the attempt 
to eliminate the hurtful effects of line drawing in prenatal diagno-
sis will fuel a broader set of discriminatory attitudes in society 
that will be much more hurtful to those with disabilities in the 
long run.37  
Forceful as this passage is, it conflates two distinct concerns: the so-
cial and psychological impact of a prenatal testing regime on people 
with disabilities, and the “kind of message it sends”—its expressive 
significance. I have argued that the stigmatization of impairments 
and the craving for perfection should not be seen as falling on some 
continuum of intolerance, but rather are quite distinct, at least in 
theory. There is no logical reason, and no psychological evidence I 
know of, that people who strive for perfection in themselves or their 
children are comparatively less tolerant of impairments than of im-
perfections or limitations that fall within the normal range for hu-
man beings. A relentless perfectionist can, quite consistently, be a 
universalist about impairment, finding all of us “impaired” when 
measured against his impossible ideal. A perfectionist may tend to 
minimize the differences between imperfections which are medically 
abnormal and normal.  
 I concede that I may be wrong about the psychology and social 
impact of perfectionism. Perhaps an unrestricted prenatal-testing re-
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gime would in fact increase the stigmatization of impairments and 
discrimination against the people who bear them. Or perhaps it 
would make little or no difference, because most prospective parents 
would end up testing only for medically severe impairments in any 
case, in part because they shared in the stigmatization of those im-
pairments, in part because those conditions were more readily tested 
for—not only because they have more detectable genetic links, but 
because the scientific development of prenatal tests reflects the popu-
lar stigmatization of the conditions tested for. 
 But this is not all that matters in gauging the expressive signifi-
cance of a prenatal-testing regime. A testing policy that gave no spe-
cial status to medical impairments, that did not treat them as provid-
ing even a presumptively stronger basis for termination than any 
other human trait or variation, would emphatically reject the excep-
tionalism about impairment that has dominated prenatal testing 
since its inception. It would “send the message,” to use Botkin’s 
phrase, that the prospect of impairment did not give parents a privi-
leged or especially strong reason to abort; that impairments were 
just some among the indefinite number of variations that might be 
relevant to the decisions of prospective parents about whether to 
bring a child into the world. 
VII.   DUTY AND BREACH: THE DUTY TO INFORM AND THE FUTURE OF 
WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS IN AN UNRESTRICTED                          
PRENATAL TESTING REGIME 
 There is considerable uncertainty about the scope of the doctor’s 
duties to inform and test under an unrestricted testing regime.38 
While this is not the place, and I am not the person, to suggest a pro-
tocol for assessing the preferences of prospective parents, several fea-
tures seem clear. First, it would not require what Botkin calls “full 
disclosure”39—the breathless recitation of every conceivable condition 
for which testing may be available. While some parents may want 
such disclosure, most will want far less, and some, none at all. The 
doctor should begin by asking the couple whether they want testing 
at all, or would rather take whatever nature yields. In the still-
distant future when prenatal therapy is available, this may no longer 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Julian Savulescu proposes a similar testing regime, in which “doctors are expected 
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be an appropriate lead question, for the doctor may not be able to 
conscientiously take “no” for an answer. But for now, a blanket re-
fusal to be tested should be conclusive, no matter how great the 
probability of a genetic abnormality, except perhaps in cases where 
the doctor has reason to suspect a substantial probability of a genetic 
or chromosomal condition that would, arguably, make the child’s life 
not worth living, his very birth a harm, for example, Tay Sachs, 
Lesch-Nyhans, Trisomies 13 or 18. (Of course, many couples would 
want to know why the doctor is asking, making the Gricean assump-
tion that there must be some heightened risk to trigger the inquiry.) 
The doctor might present an overview of the range of normal and ab-
normal phenotypes, from female gender to Tay Sachs, perhaps with 
accompanying frequencies for sample conditions. It would then be up 
to the couple (or woman—but I will assume for simplicity’s sake that 
the doctor is addressing a couple) to decide whether they wanted to 
know more about particular conditions, or about the probabilities for 
those conditions, given their ages and family histories. And it would 
then be up to the couple to decide what tests, if any, to obtain. Some 
minimum probability for the tested condition might be required—but 
not a minimum varying with “severity” in any sense of that term. 
 The obvious question of who would pay could be addressed either 
by offering different health-insurance policies, with higher premiums 
for fuller coverage, or by adopting the usual co-pay mechanism. The 
former might be unreasonably difficult, since couples would have to 
decide on testing coverage well before they decided whether to have 
children. The latter might be fairer, and consistent with a general 
destigmatization policy if the charges for tests were based on their 
actual cost, not on some professional judgment of their medical ap-
propriateness or urgency. Admittedly, those costs, as well as the very 
existence of the tests, might reflect professional judgments about pri-
orities in genetic research and development. But the very fact that it 
was not the doctor, hospital, or insurer who was making those judg-
ments would mute their expressive significance.  
 Under such a consumer-sovereignty/parental autonomy regime, 
standards for reasonable competence and adequacy in informing, 
testing, and reporting would evolve in practice, perhaps guided by 
model protocols or scripts by professional associations. The breach of 
a doctor’s duty to inform or perform with reasonable competence 
would be regarded as infringing the parents’ procreative autonomy. 
Claims for damages and offsets would be treated similarly for 
healthy and disabled children, since all are rewarding, expensive, 
and challenging, to varying degrees.40 An autonomy-based approach 
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would clearly favor uniform damages, punitive more than compensa-
tory, reflecting the slight to the parents’ freedom and dignity rather 
than the impact on their budget or their emotions. 
VIII.   THE DEATH OF WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS? 
 The expressive significance of a refusal to limit wrongful birth 
suits to cases of impairment would be muted or lost if children were 
allowed to sue for wrongful life only on the basis of their impair-
ments. One alternative would be to deny wrongful life suits alto-
gether, or to limit them to conditions so severe that they arguably 
rendered life not worth living—including Tay Sachs, Lesch Nyhans, 
Trisomies 13 and 18, but little else.41 The other alternative, which I 
want to conclude by exploring, would be to extend the approach I 
have suggested for wrongful birth claims to wrongful life claims, so 
that they were not limited to impairment, but covered any significant 
and foreseeable harm the child suffered. 
 According to a line of argument that has enjoyed some recent cur-
rency, it is presumptively wrong to bring any child into the world, not 
just a severely disabled child. This argument rests on a claimed 
asymmetry between non-creation and creation: while it is not bad to 
fail to confer the goods of life, it is good to avoid the bads of life. Thus, 
the argument goes, because there is no bad in never existing, while 
there is good in avoiding the harms of existence, the good of existence 
is balanced or offset by the good of non-existence, so that the inevita-
ble harms and sorrows of living make existence a net bad, and make 
creation a presumptive wrong.42  
 I think this argument is profoundly mistaken. But it suggests an 
approach to wrongful life cases that does not treat the birth of a dis-
abled child any differently in principle than the birth of a normal 
child. Those intentionally or negligently responsible for creating any 
child are presumptively responsible for the harms it suffers. In the 
case of parents, the care, nurturing, and material support they give 
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their children would generally discharge any obligations arising from 
the infliction of these harms. In the case of third-parties like doctors, 
any responsibility/liability they have is superceded or nullified by 
their duty to the parents to provide assistance in bringing the child 
into existence. But when they breach their duty to the parents, either 
by failing to prevent pregnancy or by failing to disclose risk factors 
that would lead the parents to test and terminate, they are liable for 
the harms of the child’s existence. As a practical matter, they become 
liable for the costs of raising the child and covering his medical ex-
penses, costs that will obviously be greater with some impairments 
but will be considerable even for a normal child conceived through 
the doctor’s negligence. 
 Many people would recoil at the idea that parents’ duties to their 
children have a corrective or compensatory character—to redress the 
wrong doing by bringing them into existence. More broadly, this ap-
proach appears to involve much the same kind of suspect moral ac-
counting as negative utilitarianism: only (non-comparative) bads are 
counted, with no offset for goods. (The actual accounting is not quite 
the same, because negative utilitarians look only at bads, while those 
who treat life-creation as a presumptive wrong either: (1) treat the 
good of existence as balanced or cancelled by the good of avoiding the 
bads of existence,43 or (2) contend that only the avoidance of bad, and 
not the attainment of good, can justify potentially harmful interven-
tions without consent.)44 
 A more modest approach may be available to impose liability for 
the foreseeable harms suffered by a child, impaired or not, who 
would not be alive but for professional negligence. On a more plausi-
ble accounting, we count goods and bads, but only if they can be at-
tributed to the agent. With this approach, the asymmetry is in the 
attribution: the bads in a child’s life may be more readily attributable 
to the agent than the goods in that life.45 But why shouldn’t a doctor 
whose negligent diagnosis averts an abortion that would otherwise 
have occurred get credit for the good as well as the bad of the im-
paired life that results? It is only in a “same number” case46—where 
the parents are committed to a fixed number of children—that the 
doctor could be said to be responsible in a but-for sense only for the 
bad, since the parents would have gone on to have a normal child had 
they aborted this time around. And making the doctor liable only in 
same-number cases would be highly problematic. The problem is not 
only epistemic; in knowing what in fact counts as a same number 
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case; it is conceptual, in determining what the criteria for such cases 
are. The problem is also moral, because the two most plausible crite-
ria for distinguishing same (and different) number cases both place 
the doctor’s liability beyond his control—parental intentions with re-
spect to the number of children they will have under different cir-
cumstances, which the doctor will not, and perhaps could or should 
not know; or the actual number of people who will ever exist in the 
world, an utterly contingent matter which no one can assess at the 
present time. 
 It is necessary to argue that there may be different states of mind 
required, or different causal connections, for the attribution of bene-
fits and burdens, or even for particular benefits and burdens. Thus, it 
could be argued that only an individual with procreative intentions 
or “parental attachment”47 can claim credit for the good of, and goods 
in, a child’s existence, states of mind that a negligent physician will 
rarely possess. Or it could be argued that the adaptive processes that 
make life not only worthwhile, but incommensurably good for people 
with various disabilities, or that transform the attitudes of their par-
ents from dread and despair to joy and enthusiasm, are, in effect, su-
perceding causes, that block any attribution to the physician or other 
third parties for the benefits arising from those transformations. 
This approach would justify both of the lawsuits arising from J. 
Bopp’s hypothetical traffic accident:48 the negligent ob/gyn is respon-
sible for the woman’s grief and burden, or at least the additional 
medical costs of raising an impaired child; the reckless driver is re-
sponsible for the traumatic loss of consortium between mother and 
child. The doctor receives no credit or offset for the transformation in 
the mother’s attitude that brought her joy and made her subsequent 
loss so traumatic; the driver receives no credit or offset for relieving 
the mother of her pre-transformation burden. The wrongful-life ana-
logue would be a severely impaired child suing a negligent doctor for 
medical expenses while suing a third-party for attempted murder. 
The doctor would get no credit or offset in the adaptation that made 
the child’s life so valuable to him, and that arguably aggravated the 
harm threatened by his post-natal assailant; the assailant would get 
no credit or offset for attempting to remove his pre-adaptation bur-
den. 
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CONCLUSION 
 I have argued, often in a somewhat oblique way, for the compara-
tive virtues of an unrestricted regime of prenatal testing over a re-
gime restricted by a criterion of “severity”—the severity of either the 
medical condition of the fetus, or the impact on the family. My pri-
mary argument has been a moral, not an empirical one—that an un-
restricted regime will avoid or mute the expressive significance of 
prenatal selection for impairment: the “message” that the prospect of 
severe impairment provides a categorically better reason for refusing 
to bring a child into the world than the indefinite number of other 
potentially burdensome traits and conditions that a child may have. 
A testing regime that limited prenatal testing to severe impairments 
would obviously send that message, while a regime that limited such 
testing to conditions likely to have a severe impact on family welfare 
would either have similar expressive significance, in its reliance on 
presumptions about the impact of severe impairments, or else re-
quire a complex, individualized inquiry into family welfare that 
would render it impracticable. 
 I have conceded both that an unrestricted testing regime might 
not reduce the adverse social and psychological impact of prenatal 
testing on people with impairments, and that it might promote a nox-
ious consumerism or perfectionism about the creation of children. 
Perhaps I underestimate the risks I concede, but my preference for 
incurring them has a moral basis as well—I think the further stig-
matization of impairments, which an unrestricted regime would be 
directed against, would be a greater evil than the further commodifi-
cation of children. But this moral conviction may rest in part on an 
empirical conviction, and perhaps a naive one—that the tendency to 
stigmatize physical and mental differences is deeply engrained and 
recalcitrant, whereas the tendency to treat children as commodities 
will be largely offset by the transformative effect of actually raising 
them. 
 
